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Abstract
We examine the macroeconomic implications of bailing-in banks’ creditors after a systemic
financial crisis, whereby bank debt is partially written off. We do so within a RBC model that
features an endogenous leverage constraint which limits the size of banks’ balance sheets by
the amount of bank net worth. Our simulations show that an unanticipated bail-in effectively
ameliorates macroeconomic conditions as more net worth relaxes leverage constraints, which
allows an expansion of investment. In contrast, an anticipated bail-in will be priced in ex-ante
by bank creditors, thereby transferring the bail-in gains from banks to creditors. Therefore
the intervention has zero impact on the macroeconomy relative to the no bail-in case. The
effectiveness of the bail-in policy can be restored by implementing a temporary tax on debt
outflows once creditors start to anticipate a bail-in.
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In 2014 the European Union (EU) adopted the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD),
in which a bail-in of bank creditors is the main tool to deal with failing banks. In that case, part of
a bank’s debt is written off, such that its creditors rather than taxpayers carry the burden from
dealing with the bank failures. In this paper we investigate the macroeconomic effectiveness of such
a bail-in through its impact on the credit transmission channel when the entire commercial banking
system becomes undercapitalized in a financial crisis. We show that anticipation effects of a future
(partial) debt write-off completely offset the positive effects from a bail-in on the banking sector’s
net worth. Therefore, the intervention has zero impact on the macroeconomy. The anticipation
effects can be reduced by imposing a temporary tax on debt outflows once creditors start to expect
a bail-in.
The most obvious example of a bail-in that deals with a systemic financial crisis is Cyprus in
March 2013, after a haircut on Greek sovereign debt held by Cypriot banks initiated a financial
crisis in its banking system. In addition, the adoption of the BRRD in 2014 made bank bail-ins
the primary instrument to deal with failing banks in the EU. Therefore, future bail-ins are to be
expected, including cases where they are used to deal with systemic banking crises. In such a scenario
the results from our paper become relevant. One region where such a scenario could materialize
is Southern-Europe. With more than 10% of total loans non-performing, the Southern-European
banking system might still be undercapitalized, despite higher capital ratios. Hence future negative
shocks can push these banking systems into a new financial crisis, in which a system-wide bank
bail-in becomes a realistic scenario.
To investigate the macroeconomic effectiveness of bail-ins, we construct a closed economy real
business cycle (RBC) model with financial frictions as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler
and Karadi (2011). In these models the size of banks’ balance sheets is limited by an endogenous
leverage constraint. Banks are financed through short-term debt and net worth.12 An agency
problem between creditors and banks constrains the latter’s ability to raise short-term debt, which is
the only asset through which households can save. Bail-ins are modeled as an exogenously imposed
reduction of both principal and interest rate payments on short-term bank debt. A partial write-off
of short-term debt liabilities effectively raises banks’ net worth compared with the case where no
bail-in is applied, everything else equal. The government has the possibility to impose a tax on
1 Throughout the paper we will interchangeably use the terms ‘banks’ and ‘(financial) intermediaries’.
2 Throughout the paper we will interchangeably use the terms ‘short-term debt’ and ‘deposits’ to denote every
possible type of debt-financing through which banks fund themselves in reality. In the same vein, we will
interchangeably use the terms ‘creditors’ and ‘depositors’.
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debt-funding that is not rolled over. We do not distinguish between insured deposits and other
types of uninsured debt-financing, and assume that all debt holdings are subject to a bail-in. 3
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to assess the macroeconomic impact of a financial-
sector-wide bail-in through a partial write-off of bank debt. An important contribution is to show
that anticipated bail-ins can only be effective in raising investment and output when they are
accompanied by an (unexpected) introduction of a tax on debt-funding that is not rolled over. In
an international environment that would amount to the introduction of capital controls, such as
happened in Cyprus at the moment a banking-sector-wide bail-in was agreed to recapitalize the
Cypriot banking sector.
Our main findings are as follows. First, we show that an unanticipated bail-in of bank creditors,
implemented the moment a systemic financial crisis hits, has a positive effect on the macroeconomy.
As bank debt is partially written off, banks’ net worth increases with respect to the case where
no bail-in is implemented. Since banks are undercapitalized in a financial crisis, higher net worth
relaxes their leverage constraints. As such, credit provision falls by less, moderating the fall in
investment and output.
Second, an unanticipated bail-in is unlikely to occur in practice: usually investors and financial
markets learn about financial troubles in the banking system (and hence the possibility of a bail-in)
before these problems are officially acknowledged by regulators. Even if they do not, there might be
legal and political constraints preventing regulators from immediately imposing a bail-in. Therefore,
investors often anticipate the possibility of a future bail-in. We therefore investigate an anticipated
bail-in which depositors start to expect as a financial crisis hits, but which is implemented one
quarter later. From this experiment, we establish our second and main result: the macroeconomic
effect of an anticipated bail-in is zero. The intuition behind this stark and seemingly counter intuitive
result is the following: households start withdrawing their short-term deposits from the bank in the
period before they (correctly) expect the bail-in to be implemented. With perfect competition in
the deposit market, and prices and interest rates perfectly flexible, banks are forced to raise the
interest rate on deposits to such an extent that the higher interest rate exactly compensates for
the losses incurred from the partial write-off of deposit liabilities. In equilibrium, no deposits are
withdrawn with respect to the case where no bail-in is implemented, and no gain in net worth is
realized. Therefore, the intervention has zero impact on the real economy.
Our third result is that the effectiveness of an anticipated bank bail-in can be restored by
imposing an (unexpected) temporary tax on the outflow of deposits at the moment households start
3 Even though in reality deposits up to e 100,000 are protected by deposit insurance schemes (and would therefore
not be subject to a bail-in), many bank deposits are not covered by such schemes, such as large cash holdings of
corporations upwards of this amount. For example, the majority of the debt that was written off in the 2013
Cypriot bail-in consisted of deposits: e7.9 billion compared to a total of e9.4 billion (International Monetary
Fund, 2014), indicating that a large share of deposits was not covered by any deposit insurance scheme. To
further support our assumption of subjecting all debt-financing to a bail-in, we note that covered deposits make
up a relatively small share of the balance sheet of financial institutions in the EU. For example, Schoenmaker
and Gros (2014) estimate that this is approximately 18.5% of total EU bank liabilities. Given the relatively small
share of debt-financing that is covered by deposit insurance, it is a reasonable approximation to assume that all
debt is bailed-in.
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to anticipate a bail-in. This raises the cost of withdrawing their deposits, which reduces the need for
banks to raise interest rates to prevent deposit outflows, which would occur in the absence of such a
tax. As such, the effect of the anticipated bail-in is offset within the household’s Euler equation,
and thus an anticipated bail-in becomes qualitatively just as effective as an unanticipated bail-in in
raising investment and output. This result rationalizes the decision by the Cypriot government to
introduce capital controls (which can be thought of as a tax on capital outflows) after a bail-in of
Cypriot banks’ creditors was agreed.
Literature review
This paper builds upon the literature that incorporates financial frictions in macroeconomic models,
specifically Gertler and Karadi (2011), Gertler and Karadi (2013) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010).
In these papers, an agency problem between depositors and bank managers forces banks to deleverage
when a shock negatively affects their balance sheets, which reduces lending to the real economy.
The innovation with respect to this literature is that we introduce the possibility of (partially)
writing-off the value of deposit liabilities.
To the best of our knowledge, the only attempt at incorporating a ‘bail-in’ in a macroeconomic
model is Breuss et al. (2015). They find that a bail-in is capable of mitigating the drop in output,
as more bank capital allows an expansion of lending to the real economy. Their bail-in, however, is
a one-off event that is unanticipated by depositors. We also find that an unanticipated bail-in has
a positive effect on output, but in addition investigate the more realistic case where bail-ins are
anticipated.
Our paper is also related to the newly developing literature that incorporates bank runs within
DSGE models (Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015); Gertler et al. (2016); Gertler et al. (2017)), which is
in these papers an equilibrium outcome, as negative shocks can push banks into insolvency. Even
though depositors in our model start withdrawing their funds once they learn about the bail-in,
banks do not become insolvent. Therefore, bank runs are not an equilibrium outcome, and depositors
are in equilibrium always willing to provide funding as banks are forced to compensate for future
bail-in losses through higher ex-ante interest rates.
Empirical evaluations of bail-ins are hard to come by, but Scha¨fer et al. (2016) provide an
investigation into the market reactions of both credit default swap (CDS) spreads and stock prices
of affected banks after a bail-in. They find that stock prices fell and banks’ CDS spreads increased
after the Cypriot bail-in. Hu¨ser et al. (2017) employ a multi-layered network model using European
System of Central Banks (ESCB) proprietary data of the 26 largest euro area banking groups to
assess the systemic implications of bail-ins.
The issue of bail-ins has also been examined in the corporate finance literature. Mendicino
et al. (2017) investigate the optimal size and composition of banks’ total loss absorbing capacity
(TLAC), for which bail-in debt can (partially) be used. Keister (2015) shows that a no bailout
policy, which amounts to a bail-in policy, removes the distortion of ex-ante incentives that arises
from the anticipation of a bailout, but may make the economy more susceptible to financial crisis.
Taxing short-term liabilities offsets these negative effects on ex-ante incentives. Mitkov and Keister
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(2017) study the interaction between a government’s bailout policy and the willingness of individual
banks to impose bail-ins on their creditors. While these papers employ partial equilibrium models,
and feature agency problems such as risk-shifting and private benefit taking, the crucial mechanism
in our paper is driven by a general equilibrium effect, while we abstract from risk-shifting issues.
Our paper is also related to the literature that analyzes macro-prudential policy, and more
specifically the literature in which (Pigouvian) taxes and/or subsidies are imposed to correct
externalities (Gertler et al. (2012); Jeanne and Korinek (2010a); Jeanne and Korinek (2010b);
Korinek (2011)). These externalities arise when individual market participants do not take the
interaction between debt accumulation and asset prices into account that magnifies credit booms
and busts. However, in our model such a tax is not imposed on bankers issuing more short-term
debt, which would address this externality (see Gertler et al. (2012)), but rather on households to
prevent them from taking out their deposit holdings.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II presents the model, and section III describes the
calibration of the model. Section IV analyzes the effects of a bail-in after a financial crisis, while
section V reflects and discusses our main findings and some of the underlying assumptions that
drive them. Section VI concludes.
II. Model
We construct a closed economy RBC model with a banking sector a` la Gertler and Karadi (2011).
We extend their setup by including the possibility to bail-in bank creditors. Banks provide loans to
final goods producers, who use these loans to purchase capital from capital goods producers. These
banks are financed through net worth and short-term debt and are balance-sheet constrained due to
an agency problem between banks and creditors (Gertler and Karadi, 2011).
Other agents considered in our model are households, non-financial firms, and a fiscal authority.
Households consist of bankers who operate financial intermediaries, and workers who supply labor to
final goods producers. At the end of the period, they pool resources to ensure perfect consumption
insurance. Households can save, but only through short-term deposits that are potentially subject to
a bail-in. In addition, the government has the possibility to impose a tax on deposit outflows from
the banking system, which is then returned to households through a lump-sum transfer (Jeanne and
Korinek (2010a); Jeanne and Korinek (2010b); Korinek (2011)). Final goods producers borrow from
banks to purchase capital from capital goods producers and hire labor from households. Capital
goods producers buy final goods and refurbish used capital, which they sell to final goods producers.
The final good is consumed by households and sold to capital goods producers for investment
purposes.
Our main innovation lies in the possibility to bail-in creditors, which is implemented through an
exogeneous reduction of deposit liabilities during or after a financial crisis: both the principal value
and interest payments of bank debt are reduced. The introduction of this policy rule allows us to
examine the anticipation effects of a bail-in in a relatively straightforward manner.
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A. Households
Households are infinitely lived and have identical preferences. A fraction f of household members
are workers and a fraction 1 − f bankers. Each household has perfect consumption insurance
among its members. Households receive income from labor WtLt, gross interest payments (including




Dt−1, and profits from firms and
banks owned Πt. However, a fraction Ψt of gross interest payments will be written off and not
repaid. If Ψt = 0, all deposit liabilities are honored by the bank, while Ψt > 0 denotes the bail-in





(1−Ψt)Dt−1. The functional form of Ψt is specified in section II.D.
Income is spent on consumption Ct, savings in the form of bank debt Dt, lump-sum taxes Tt,
and a tax τt on deposit outflows Dt−1 − Dt with respect to period t − 1. Hence households are
taxed if they withdraw deposits from the bank, i.e Dt−1 > Dt, while they are subsidized if they
increase deposits (Dt−1 < Dt). Within our model, this will be used as a temporary measure to
induce households not to withdraw their deposits in times of financial crises. We assume utility is
separable in consumption and labor, and assume habit formation in consumption to realistically
capture consumption dynamics (Christiano et al., 2005). The household’s optimization problem is








1− σ (Ct+s − hCt+s−1)





β ∈ (0, 1) , h ∈ [0, 1), ϕ ≥ 0,
where β is the household’s discount factor, σ risk aversion, h habit persistence, χ the utility
weight of labor, and ϕ the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply, while Lt denotes the number of
hours worked. Households choose consumption, labor and savings subject to the following budget
constraint:





The standard first order conditions can be found in Appendix A.A. The only non-standard optimality









 = 1. (1)
where βΛt,t+1 ≡ β λt+1λt is the household’s stochastic discount factor, and λt is the marginal utility
of consumption. Unless otherwise specified, we set the tax on deposit outflows τt equal to zero, in











We see from (2) that households take the possibility into account that only a fraction 1−Ψt+1 of
the promised gross interest payment will be honored when deciding how much to save. Therefore,
expectations of a bail-in, captured by Ψt+1 > 0, will affect the equilibrium interest rate on bank
debt rdt : if Ψt+1 increases, then rdt must increase to compensate for expected losses.
B. Non-financial firms
B.1. Final goods producers
A continuum of perfectly competitive final goods producers i ∈ [0, 1] acquire loans from banks Skj,t−1
for a price Qkt−1 to buy capital Ki,t−1 from capital goods producers. We assume that next period’s
profits can credibly be pledged to the bank (Gertler and Karadi, 2011). Using previous period’s






where At and ξkt are, respectively, technology and capital quality (Gertler and Karadi, 2011), both
of which are driven by lognormal stochastic AR(1) processes. There is a perfectly competitive
labor market in which workers are paid their marginal product. After production, the (depreciated)
effective capital stock is sold to capital goods producers for a price Qkt . These revenues (net of
wages) are used to repay the firm’s loan, and thus determine the return on capital:








B.2. Capital goods producers
Capital goods producers buy the net effective capital stock (1− δ) ξktKt−1 and It goods from final
goods producers to combine used capital and final goods into new capital, which is sold to final
goods producers for a price Qkt . We assume capital goods producers face convex adjustment costs.
The law of motion for capital is then given by:









Profits for capital goods producers equal revenues from selling refurbished capital minus the costs
of purchasing used capital and final goods. These are given by:
Πkt = QktKt −Qkt (1− δ)ξktKt−1 − It.
The maximization problem is then to maximize the sum of current and expected discounted future




A continuum of banks j ∈ [0, 1] act as intermediaries between savers and borrowers. Bank j extends




j,t = Nj,t +Dj,t.
Loans pay a net return rkt+1 in period t + 1. On the funding side, banks pay a net return on





Dj,t (which includes repayment of the principal), where Ψt+1 denotes the
bail-in variable. Hence, in a bail-in (Ψt+1 > 0), banks’ net worth increases everything else equal
because the gross interest payments on short-term debt Dj,t are reduced by a fraction Ψt+1 relative


































the no bail-in case, everything else equal.
Bank j maximizes expected discounted future profits. Each period they face a constant probability
of exit 1 − ϑ, in which case, the bank pays out its remaining net worth Nj,t+1 to the household.
Banks continue operating with probability ϑ. Since banks are owned by households, expected future
cash flows are discounted with the household’s stochastic discount factor. The optimization problem
is then characterized by the following recursively defined maximand:
Vj,t = max{Skj,t,Dj,t}
Et {βΛt,t+1 [(1− ϑ)Nj,t+1 + ϑVj,t+1]} .
Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), we assume that bankers have to possibility to divert assets
during the transition to the next period. Creditors will then force the bank into bankruptcy, but
can only recoup a fraction 1 − λk of assets, effectively leaving bankers with a share λk of assets.
As creditors take the possibility of asset diversion into account, they are only willing to provide
additional deposits as long as the continuation value of the intermediary exceeds the bank’s gains
from asset diversion, which gives rise to the following incentive compatibility constraint (ICC):
Vj,t ≥ λkQkt Skj,t.
4 We assume households bring their deposits to a bank other than the one they own to prevent self-financing,
which would allow them to circumvent the incentive compatibility constraint to be introduced shortly.
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We solve the bank’s optimization problem in Appendix A.C.1, and find the following first order





















where Ωt,t+1 ≡ βΛt,t+1
[




is the bank’s stochastic discount factor,
which consists of the household’s stochastic discount factor and a factor that captures financial
frictions. The first order conditions introduce a new term compared to the literature, i.e. the bail-in
term Ψt+1. In Appendix A.C.1 we show that we can write the ICC as:




where φt is the bank’s endogenous leverage ratio. This condition shows that the size of the balance
sheet is restricted by the amount of net worth of intermediary j.
C.1. Aggregation of financial variables
Integrating over all banks yields the following aggregate balance sheet of the banking sector:
Qkt S
k
t = Nt +Dt, (7)
Since (6) does not depend on any individual bank characteristics, and assuming that the leverage
constraint is always binding, the aggregate leverage constraint is given by:
φtNt = Qkt Skt . (8)
Each period, a constant fraction 1− ϑ of bankers become workers, and bring their remaining net
worth to the household, while ϑ bankers continue operating. Every period the number of new
bankers that start operating a new bank equal the number of bankers that exited, such that the
size of the banking sector is constant. Households provide new bankers with funds equal to a share
of χF / (1− ϑ) of assets of bankers that exited. The aggregate law of motion for net worth is then
















A government regulator, e.g. the Single Resolution Board (SRB), can decide to implement a bail-in
of creditors at all banks: in that case, a fraction Ψt > 0 of the gross interest payments on deposits
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(including repayment of the principal) is written off, and does not need to be repaid by banks
to creditors. The fraction of promised gross interest payment that is written off is given by an
exogenous process which depends on the capital quality shock when % < 0:
Ψt = %εξk,t−l. (10)
The bail-in can be implemented immediately (l = 0) or with a lag (l > 0).
D.2. Fiscal authority
The fiscal authority levies lump sum taxes Tt on households and a tax τt on the change in households’
short-term debt holdings Dt with respect to previous period’s debt holdings Dt−1 (Gertler et al.,
2012; Jeanne and Korinek, 2010a,b; Korinek 2011). There are no government expenditures, as the
government does not issue debt nor does it purchase any goods. Hence its budget constraint is given
by:
Tt + τt (Dt−1 −Dt) = 0. (11)
When τt = 0, lump-sum taxes Tt are zero as well. However, when τt > 0, and households withdraw
deposits from the banking system (Dt−1 > Dt), the revenues from the tax on deposit outflows are
returned to households through a lump-sum transfer (Tt < 0). Vice versa, when households increase
deposits with respect to the previous period (Dt−1 < Dt), the government subsidy is paid by levying
lump-sum taxes Tt > 0. The tax-rate on deposit outflows is given by:
τt = ζεξk,t−z. (12)
When ζ < 0, the tax on the change in households’ short-term debt holdings increases if a negative
shock to the quality of capital arrives. Like the bail-in policy, the tax can be implemented immediately
(z = 0) or with a lag (z > 0). Unless otherwise specified, τt = 0 in our simulations.
E. Market clearing
The goods market clears when output equals the sum of consumption and investment:
Yt = Ct + It. (13)
Loans to final goods producers must equal the total capital stock:
Skt = Kt. (14)
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III. Calibration
The model is calibrated on a quarterly frequency and largely follows Gertler and Karadi (2011)
calibration for the United States. Table 1 presents an overview. We use the same parameter values
for the share of capital in output α, the subjective discount factor β, investment adjustment costs γ,
habit formation h, the inverse Frisch elasticity ϕ, and risk aversion σ. The disutility weight of labor
χ is chosen to target a steady state labor supply of 1/3.
We also follow Gertler and Karadi (2011) for the calibration of the banking sector’s parameters.
As such, we set the aggregate leverage ratio to 4, and set the credit spread to 25 basis points per
quarter in the steady state. The average survival time for bankers is set to 36 quarters, i.e. ϑ = 0.972.
The transfer to new bankers χF and the share of assets that bankers can divert λk are calibrated
such that the previously mentioned targets are matched. Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), we
initiate a financial crisis through a shock to the quality of capital ξkt of 5%, with autocorrelation
coefficient ρξk set to 0.66.
Table 1 Model parameters
Parameter Value Definition
Households
β 0.99 Subjective discount factor
σ 1 Risk aversion
h 0.815 Habit persistence parameter
χ 3.6407 Relative utility weight of labor
ϕ 0.276 Inverse Frisch elasticity
Banking sector
λk 0.3863 Fraction of divertable assets
χF 0.0021 Transfer to entering bankers
ϑ 0.972 Survival rate of bankers
Non-financial firms
α 0.33 Capital share in output
γ 1.728 Investment adjustment cost parameter
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate
Autoregressive components
ρA 0.95 Autoregressive component of productivity
ρξk 0.66 Autoregressive component of capital quality
Shocks
σA 0.01 Standard deviation of productivity
σξk 0.05 Standard deviation of capital quality
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IV. Results
In this section we present the results from our simulations. We start by providing a baseline scenario
in which we investigate the response of our model economy to a negative capital quality shock as
in Gertler and Karadi (2011), and compare the results from this simulation with several bail-in
policies, which has become the main tool to deal with failing banks in the EU after the introduction
of the BRRD in 2014.
A. An unanticipated bail-in after a financial crisis
FollowingGertler and Karadi (2011), we initiate a financial crisis in our model economy with a
negative capital quality shock εξk,t of 5%. In Figure 1 we compare the response of our model
economy in the absence of any policy interventions (blue, solid) with an unanticipated bail-in that
is implemented at the moment the financial crisis hits the economy (red, dashed), and consists of a
partial write-off of gross interest payments (including the repayment of the principal). We set Ψt




Dt−1 amounts to 5% of annual steady state output.
Consider first the model response to a capital quality shock without any bail-ins (blue, solid line).
The shock reduces the effective capital stock, lowering the ex-post return on banks’ loans rkt , as can
be seen from equation (3). Net worth Nt drops by approximately 50% of steady state net worth,
which tightens the balance sheet constraint of financial intermediaries. The resulting increase in the
credit spread causes demand for loans (and hence for physical capital) from final goods producers
to fall, which leads to a drop in the price of capital Qkt . Such a price drop further reduces the
ex-post return on capital rkt , see equation (3), and leads to a further reduction of net worth, which
amplifies the effects from the initial capital quality shock. Since final goods producers need funding
from financial intermediaries to be able to purchase physical capital Kt, the lower demand for loans
leads to lower investment It and a fall in the capital stock. In addition, the financial crisis reduces
households’ income, which leads to a drop in consumption. The subsequent drop in investment and
consumption cause output Yt to drop by approximately 4% with respect to the steady state.
All in all, a financial crisis caused by a quality of capital shock leads to a relatively severe
recession: output falls by approximately 4% and investment by more than 10% with respect to the
steady state.
Next we investigate whether an unanticipated bail-in, modeled as an immediate partial write-off
of gross interest payments on deposits implemented at the moment the financial crisis hits, is capable
of mitigating the adverse macroeconomic consequences of the banking crisis (red, dashed line in
Figure 1). The bail-in clearly has positive effects on the economy: output still falls on impact, but
the trough is not as low as in the no intervention case. Investment also falls by less and recovers
more quickly. The reason is that the bail-in reduces gross interest payments to depositors, which
leaves more net worth in the banking system. Higher net worth (relative to the no intervention case)
relaxes intermediaries’ balance sheet constraints, which allows them to expand lending to final goods
producers. More lending allows final goods producers to increase investment, and a higher capital
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stock raises the marginal product of labor which increases households’ incomes (not shown). As a
result, consumption increases relative to the no intervention case. Hence, an immediate bail-in is
quite effective at alleviating the negative macroeconomic effects from a financial crisis, as investment
and output fall by less.
Although our results show that an unanticipated bail-in is effective at ameliorating macroeconomic
conditions during a financial crisis, investors and financial market participants usually learn about
financial troubles (and the possibility of a bail-in) before regulators officially acknowledge banking
sector troubles. And even if this were not the case, there can be a lag between the announcement of
a bail-in and its execution due to legal and political constraints, which allows investors to withdraw
their funds before implementation. Therefore, the assumption that the bail-in is unanticipated
might not be entirely realistic.
B. The macroeconomic implications of an anticipated bail-in
Although we showed that an unanticipated bail-in can improve macroeconomic conditions during a
financial crisis, it is more likely that a bail-in will be anticipated by investors and financial market
participants. Even in the case of Cyprus, which was the first time a bail-in was implemented in
modern history, the possibility of a write-down of uncovered bank debt already surfaced in January
of 2013 (Thomas (2013), Fidler et al. (2013)), two months before the bail-in was announced in
March 2013.
In line with these observations, we turn to a scenario where a bail-in is anticipated by creditors:
at the moment the financial crisis hits, households (correctly) anticipate that a bail-in will be
implemented one quarter later. The results of this simulation are presented in Figure (2), in which





Dt−1 equal to 5% of annual steady state output is written off.
The impulse response functions show that an anticipated bail-in has zero effect on the real
economy. As the bail-in is anticipated, households start withdrawing their debt holdings in the
period before they (correctly) expect the bail-in to be implemented. As there is perfect competition
in the market for short-term debt, and with prices and interest rates perfectly flexible, banks are
forced to raise interest rates to such an extent that the future gains in net worth from the partial
write-off are transferred to households. In equilibrium, the deposit interest rate rdt increases by 300
basis points. As a result, the credit spread, which is the difference between the expected return on
loans and the interest rate rdt on deposits, drops by 300 basis points in the first period. Because the
banks’ gains from the bail-in are exactly offset by higher interest payments, the net impact of an
anticipated bail-in on net worth is zero, and hence there is no impact on the real economy.
With zero impact on the economy relative to the no policy intervention case, the question arises
whether bail-ins in general, and the 2013 Cypriot bail-in in particular, are an effective policy to deal
with a failing banking system from a macroeconomic perspective. However, in the case of Cyprus
the bail-in was accompanied by the imposition of capital controls, which made it more difficult, or
even impossible for creditors to withdraw their funds from the bank. Did these capital controls make
13












































































































Figure 1. Impulse response functions for model without policy intervention (blue, solid) vs. model with immediate
bail-in, where bank debt equal to 5% of annual steady state output is written down (red, dashed). The financial crisis
is initiated through a capital quality shock of 5%.
14
the bail-in more effective? Can a tax on deposit outflows, which is the closed-economy equivalent
of capital controls, improve the macroeconomic effectiveness of (anticipated) bail-ins? This is the
question we turn to in the next section.













































Figure 2. Impulse response functions for model without policy intervention (blue, solid) vs. model with anticipated
bail-in that is executed one quarter after the shock arrives, where bank debt equal to 5% of annual steady state output
is written down (red, dashed). The financial crisis is initiated through a capital quality shock of 5%.
C. Taxing deposit outflows
We showed in the previous section that anticipated bail-ins have zero impact on the macroeconomy
compared with no policy intervention. In this section we investigate whether the imposition of an
unexpected temporary tax on deposit outflows can make an anticipated bail-in more effective, see
also Gertler et al. (2012), Jeanne and Korinek (2010a,b), and Korinek (2011).
We saw in the previous section that the effects of the anticipated bail-in manifest themselves in
the form of a higher interest rate on deposits rdt in the period before the bail-in is imposed, as bank
creditors (correctly) take into account that not all promised payments will be honored. The crucial
mechanism through which this higher interest rate is established, is that depositors have the ability
to withdraw their funds without any costs. We therefore investigate whether making it more difficult
for creditors to withdraw their funds, by unexpectedly imposing a tax on deposit outflows in the
period before creditors (correctly) anticipate a bail-in, can improve the macroeconomic effectiveness
of the bail-in policy.
Just as in the previous section, we will investigate a bail-in which is (correctly) anticipated
by bank creditors in the period in which the financial crisis hits the economy (period 1), but
implemented one quarter later (period 2). In our simulations, we will implement an unexpected
temporary tax on deposit outflows in period 1 (τ1 > 0), while setting the tax on deposit outflows
15
equal to zero in all subsequent periods τt = 0 for all t > 1. But before going to the simulations, we
will first show that a properly chosen sequence of tax-rates τt can completely offset the behavioral
effects from the anticipated bail-in:
Proposition 1. The behavioral effects of a (correctly) anticipated bail-in in period t + 1 can be
completely offset by (unexpectedly) setting the tax rate τt on deposit outflows in period t equal to the
fraction of gross interest payments Ψt+1 that will be written off under the bail-in in period t+ 1,
while setting the tax rate equal to zero afterwards.
Proof. Substitution of τt = Ψt+1 and τt+1 = 0 into the household’s Euler equation for bank debt 1








As Ψt+1 no longer features in the household’s Euler equation, there is no behavioral effect from the
anticipated bail-in on household’s savings decision.
The intuition behind this result is the following: the anticipation of a bail-in effectively reduces
gross interest payments in period t + 1 (on funds Dt deposited in period t) by a fraction Ψt+1.
However, reducing Dt by one euro through withdrawing requires paying a tax Ψt+1 in period
t. Households’ deposit holdings are therefore effectively reduced by a fraction Ψt+1, irrespective
whether they continue saving or withdraw deposits from the bank. Hence, the anticipated bail-in
will no longer affect households’ savings decisions.
We now turn to the simulations in Figure 3 where we compare the anticipated bail-in from the
previous section (blue, solid) with the case where deposit outflows are taxed one period before
the bail-in is implemented in addition to the anticipated bail-in from the previous section (red,
dashed). We clearly see that such a tax restores the effectiveness of the bail-in policy, as net worth,
investment and output increase with respect to the case where no such tax is implemented.
The economic intuition behind this result is relatively straightforward: the tax on deposit
outflows removes the possibility for households to avoid the negative consequences of the anticipated
bail-in by withdrawing their funds, as their current stock of deposit holdings will be reduced by
a fraction Ψt+1 irrespective of whether they withdraw or not. Unlike the previous section, the
incentive to start withdrawing disappears. This removes the need for banks to raise interest rates
that was previously necessary to induce households to keep their deposits in the bank. Hence the
removal of the need to raise interest rates allows banks to keep the gains from the anticipated future
bail-in.
We show in Figure 4 in the Appendix that the results from the unanticipated bail-in and an
anticipated bail-in with an (unexpected) tax on deposit outflows shown in this section are equivalent.
The reason is that in both cases the household’s savings decisions are unaffected by the bail-in.
Hence households will in both cases make the same savings decisions once the bail-in has been
implemented, which allows the banking sector to obtain all the gains in net worth from the bail-in.
16











































Figure 3. Impulse response functions for model with anticipated bail-in that is executed one quarter after the shock
arrives without tax on deposit outflows (blue, solid) vs. model with anticipated bail-in that is executed one quarter
after the shock arrives with (unanticipated) tax on deposit outflows in the period before the anticipated bail-in (red,
dashed). Both interventions have bank debt write downs equal to 5% of annual steady state output. The financial
crisis is initiated through a capital quality shock of 5%.
The results from this section show that the effectiveness of an anticipated bank bail-in can be
restored by unexpectedly implementing a temporary tax on deposit outflows. This rationalizes
the imposition of capital controls, which can be thought of as a tax on deposit outflows within
our framework, by the Cypriot government once it was agreed that its banking system would be
recapitalized through a bail-in of bank creditors. Clearly, in a European Union with free movement of
capital, such a step came completely unexpected, which validates the assumption in our simulations
regarding the expectations of such a tax on deposit outflows.
V. Discussion
In this section we discuss some of the (implicit) assumptions we have made, and how these affect
our results.
First, one could argue that it is not clear whether a bank that is undercapitalized and perhaps
insolvent has the capacity to pay a higher interest rate on its liabilities, which is the main mechanism
through which the effectiveness of the bail-in is reduced in our paper. However, this does not
necessarily invalidate our qualitative result regarding the macroeconomic effectiveness of anticipated
bail-ins. When banks cannot pay higher interest rates, creditors will start withdrawing deposits
compared with the no-intervention case. This forces the bank to shrink the balance sheet and
negatively affects credit provision to the real economy. Similarly to our mechanism, this would
reduce the effectiveness of the intervention.
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This brings us to a second reservation, namely that the anticipation of a bail-in might induce
a bank run, which is a feature we do not incorporate. In that case, a bail-in will not be effective,
which is in line with the main result of our paper. It is an interesting avenue for future research to
investigate the effectiveness of bank bail-ins when banks can be subject to bank runs. Implementing
bank runs would require solving the model with global solution methods (Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2015),Gertler et al. (2016),Gertler et al. (2017)), which we leave for future projects.
A third reservation is that a significant part of bank liabilities consists of long-term debt. When
these claims do not have to be repaid before the bail-in is imposed, this would surely mitigate the
stark results that we find in our current setup, as creditors cannot force the bank to raise interest
rates on outstanding long-term liabilities (although the yield on such claims would surely increase
if these claims are traded in financial markets). However, our results would qualitatively still go
through, as a significant fraction of bank liabilities is short-term, while some of the longer-term
liabilities might have to be rolled over in the period between when financial markets start to
anticipate a bail-in and its actual implementation. At the time of such a roll-over, long-term
creditors would either withdraw their funds or demand a higher interest rate to compensate for the
future losses arising from the bail-in, which again would reduce the macroeconomic effectiveness of
the bail-in.
A fourth reservation might be that banks in our setup do not go bankrupt in the absence of a
bail-in, while one of the three conditions to be fulfilled before the bail-in tool can be employed is that
a bank is failing or likely to fail (FLTF) (Hu¨ser et al., 2017). The mechanism through which bail-ins
become ineffective in our paper, however, is through higher interest payments that are promised
before the banking system goes actually bankrupt. Whether or not the banking system would
go bankrupt does not matter for our results, as long as the ex-post-bail-in return that investors
expected is honored. That conclusion might change if the regulator implements a larger bail-in than
expected by investors. In that case, investors have not priced in the bail-in correctly, in which case
the bail-in becomes more effective as not all gains are transferred to bank creditors.
The message of our paper seems to be that bail-ins are not very effective as a macroeconomic
policy tool. That, however, would be too quick of a conclusion, as our paper does not investigate
long-run financial stability issues. From that angle, one could arrive at different conclusions, as
our model abstracts from moral hazard issues: the knowledge that shareholders and bank creditors
might be bailed in, could induce banks to take less risk, and thereby reduce the probability of future
financial crises (ECB, 2016). This beneficial effect of bail-ins is absent in our model.
VI. Conclusion
Motivated by the Cypriot bail-in of 2013 and the adoption of the Bank Recovery and Resolution
Directive (BRRD) in the EU in 2014, we investigate the macroeconomic effectiveness of bailing in
bank creditors in response to a systemic financial crisis through its effect on the credit transmission
channel. We construct a closed economy RBC model enriched with a balance-sheet-constrained
banking sector a` la Gertler and Karadi (2011) in which the size of the balance sheet is limited by
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the amount of bank net worth. We model a bail-in as a partial write-off of both principal and
promised interest payments on bank debt, which increases commercial banks’ net worth relative to
no intervention everything else equal.
Our simulations show that an immediate, unanticipated bail-in of depositors is effective at
alleviating the negative effects of a financial crisis. The bail-in reduces the fall in net worth, which
alleviates banks’ balance sheet constraint. As banks’ endogenous leverage constraints are relaxed,
they expand credit provision to the real economy, which reduces the drop in investment and output
relative to the no intervention case.
In reality, however, bail-ins seldom occur unexpectedly. Investors and financial market par-
ticipants usually detect financial troubles in the banking system before regulators will officially
acknowledge financial sector troubles and implement a bail-in of bank creditors. And even if they
do, there is usually time between the announcement of the bail-in and its implementation due to
legal and political constraints. Therefore, we investigate the more realistic case of an anticipated
bail-in, in which bank creditors start to (correctly) expect a partial write-off of both principal and
interest payments as a financial crisis hits, which is implemented one quarter later. We find that a
bail-in in such a scenario has zero impact on the real economy compared with no policy intervention:
as depositors know that their promised gross interest payments (including principal) will not be
fully honored, they start withdrawing their funds in the period before they anticipate the bail-in to
be implemented. With a perfectly competitive deposit market, and perfectly flexible prices and
interest rates, banks have to raise interest rates to such an extent that the future gains from the
bail-in are transferred back to depositors. As a result, the change in net worth compared to the
no intervention case is zero, which leaves the real economy unaffected as the lending expansion
observed under an unanticipated bail-in does not materialize.
Our results imply that in a world of perfect capital mobility, a correctly anticipated bail-in is
ineffective as a macroeconomic policy tool in dealing with a financial crisis. We show, however, that
the bail-in policy regains its effectiveness when an unanticipated temporary tax is levied on deposit
outflows in addition to the bail-in. As the costs of withdrawing bank debt increases, banks do not
need to raise interest rates to keep deposits in the bank, which allows them to keep the bail-in gains.
This result rationalizes why the Cypriot government not only imposed a bail-in on bank creditors in
March 2013, but in addition imposed capital controls to prevent bank creditors from withdrawing
their funds.
Our paper seems to raise doubts whether bail-ins are the preferred policy to deal with failing
banks, as foreseen by the BRRD. However, we do not investigate long-run financial stability issues:
for example banks might take less risk if they know that shareholders and bank creditors might
be bailed in, which reduces the probability of future financial crises (ECB, 2016). Hence from a
financial stability perspective, bail-ins might still be a good idea.
19
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A. Mathematical appendix
A. Household








1− σ (Ct+s − hCt+s−1)





β ∈ (0, 1) , h ∈ [0, 1), ϕ ≥ 0,
The next step in finding a solution to the household’s optimization problem is to maximize the
household’s lifetime utility function (16) subject to the following budget constraint:




(1−Ψt)Dt−1 + Πt, (17)






1− σ (Ct+s − hCt+s−1)














−Ct+s −Dt+s − Tt+s − τt+s (Dt+s−1 −Dt+s)]} . (18)
Solving the household’s optimization problem yields the following first order conditions:
Ct : λt = (Ct − hCt−1)−σ − βhEt(Ct+1 − hCt)−σ, (19)









 = 1. (21)
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B. Non-financial firms
B.1. Final goods producers






Taking the first order condition with respect to labor, we get that the wage rate equals:
Wt = (1− α)Yi,t
Li,t
. (23)
The representative final goods firm’s profits are equal to:
Πfi,t = Yi,t +Qkt (1− δ)ξktKi,t−1 − (1 + rkt )Qkt−1Ki,t−1 −WtLi,t, (24)
which states that profits are equal to production plus the income gained after selling previous
period’s capital stock net of depreciation times the price of capital, minus the cost of capital and
the wage bill. Since firms operate in a perfectly competitive environment, profits are zero. We plug
the expression for the wage rate into the final goods firm’s profit function, set the profit function to
zero, and solve for the return on capital. This equals:








B.2. Capital goods producers
Final goods producers sell their used capital stock to capital producers. They sell the capital stock
net of depreciation, i.e. (1 − δ)Kt−1 for a price Qkt . Capital producers use the final good It to
refurbish the depreciated capital stock. They face convex adjustment costs, which depend on the
change in investment It relative to the previous period. The law of motion for capital is then:









Profits for capital goods producers are then the revenue they make from selling refurbished capital,
minus the costs they incur when purchasing used capital and final goods used in the refurbishing
process:
Πkt = QktKt −Qkt (1− δ)ξktKt−1 − It. (27)
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The capital producers’ maximization problem is then to maximize the sum of current and expected

















where the household’s stochastic discount factor is used to discount future profits, since the household
owns the capital goods producing firms. Maximizing the objective function by differentiating with
































B.3. Aggregation of non-financial firms
To find expressions for aggregate supply, we aggregate (22) for all firms i. Aggregation over the left
hand yields: ∫ 1
0
Yi,t di = Yt. (30)
















We can find the capital-labor ratio by inspecting the factor prices. Rewriting these gives us that:







Qkt−1 −Qkt (1− δ) ξkt
. (33)








Qkt−1 −Qkt (1− δ) ξkt
]
, (34)
where we can clearly see that the individual capital-labor ratio does not depend on any individual
































Banks can invest in loans to intermediate goods firms Skj,t for a price Qkt . Banks fund themselves
through net worth Nj,t and deposits Dj,t. The balance sheet of a bank j is therefore given by:
Qkt S
k
j,t = Nj,t +Dj,t. (37)












The bank maximizes expected discounted future profits:
Vj,t = max{Skj,t,Dj,t}
Et {βΛt,t+1 [(1− ϑ)Nj,t+1 + ϑVj,t+1]} (39)
As in Gertler and Karadi (2011), there is a principal-agent problem between banks and depositors.
This is characterized by the following incentive compatibility constraint:
Vj,t ≥ λkQkt Skj,t (40)
A typical bank’s optimization problem is therefore given by:
Vj,t = max{Skj,t,Dj,t}
Et {βΛt,t+1 [(1− ϑ)Nj,t+1 + ϑVj,t+1]} ,
s.t.
Vj,t ≥ λkQkt Skj,t,
Qkt S
k
















. We set up the following Lagrangian:
































This yields the following first order conditions:













− µtλkQkt − χtQkt = 0 (42)













+ χt = 0. (43)
Note that we do not yet have an expression for the partial derivatives of the next period’s value
















Iterating these forward and plugging them into the first order conditions, we get that:
Skj,t : Et
{



















= χt1 + µt
. (47)


























βΛt,t+1 [(1− ϑ) + ϑ (1 + µt+1) ηt+1]
(
















Next, we assume that a typical bank’s value is linear in loans and deposits:
Vj,t = νkt Qkt Skj,t + ηtNj,t. (52)















Assuming that the incentive compatibility constraint is binding at all times, we substitute that into































where Ωt,t+1 ≡ βΛt,t+1
[




. Comparing this result to our conjectured





















where we can clearly see that our conditions coincide with those we found using the Lagrangian
method. To derive the leverage ratio, we substitute the conjectured solution into the incentive
compatibility constraint. This gives us that:
Qkt S
k




Finally, note that the stochastic discount factor of intermediaries is given by
Ωt,t+1 ≡ βΛt,t+1
[




as well as by
Ωt,t+1 ≡ βΛt,t+1 [(1− ϑ) + ϑ (1 + µt+1) ηt+1]. Hence we need to prove that for a binding incentive






. Hence we can write:











ηt = (1 + µt) ηt,











C.2. Aggregation of financial variables
Aggregating over the balance sheet identity of all banks yields:
Qkt S
k
t = Dt +Nt. (58)
We can also aggregate over banks the find the following macroeconomic leverage constraint:
φtNt = Qkt Skt . (59)
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The fiscal authority raises revenue by levying lump sum taxes Tt and a deposit tax τt on households.
Note that lump sum taxes can also be negative. Hence, if the deposit tax increases, the proceeds are
redistributed in a lump sum manner to households. The government budget constraint is therefore
given by:
Tt + τt (Dt−1 −Dt) = 0. (61)
The deposit tax takes the take the following functional form:
τt = ζεξk,t−z. (62)
Hence the government imposes a tax on deposits τt in case a shock to the quality of capital hits the
economy, i.e. if ζ < 0. The tax on deposits can be carried out on impact (z = 0) or with a lag of
one or more periods (z > 0).
Banks can also receive an injection of new net worth through a bail-in that converts a fraction
Ψt of deposits into net worth after/during a credit crisis. This can be seen as a policy measure that
is imposed by some sort of regulator, e.g. the Single Resolution Board (SRB) that oversees the
resolution of banks in EU Member States. The bail-in variable is parametrized as follows:
Ψt = %εξk,t−l. (63)
Deposits are written down if a shock to the quality of capital arrives, i.e. % < 0. Like the
recapitalization, the bail-in can be implemented on impact (l = 0) or with a lag (l > 0).
E. Market clearing
For the goods market to clear, output must equal the sum of consumption and investment:
Yt = Ct + It. (64)
The total amount of corporate loans must equal the total capital stock:
Skt = Kt. (65)
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B. Equilibrium conditions
The first order conditions for the household are:
λt = (Ct − hCt−1)−σ − βhEt(Ct+1 − hCt)−σ, (66)






























































Wt = (1− α)Yt
Lt
. (73)
The first order conditions for the banking sector are:
Qkt S
k


















































. The evolution of fiscal variables is given by:
0 = Tt + τt (Dt−1 −Dt) , (80)
τt = ζεξk,t−n, (81)
Ψt = %εξk,t−l. (82)
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Markets clear:
Yt = Ct + It, (83)
Kt = Skt . (84)
Stochastic processes evolve according to:
log(At) = ρA log(At−1) + εA,t, (85)
log(ξkt ) = ρξk log(ξkt−1) + εξk,t. (86)
C. Recursive competitive equilibrium
Let Xt =
[
Ct−1, Skt−1,Kt−1, Dt−1, Nt−1, It−1, Yt−1, rdt−1, At, ξkt
]
be the state vector. A recursive
competitive equilibrium is a sequence of quantities
{
Ct+s, Lt+s, Dt+s,Kt+s, It+s, Yt+s, Skt+s,


















• The first order conditions for the household: (66) - (68).
• The first order conditions for non-financial firms: (69) - (73).
• The first order conditions for the banking sector: (74) - (79).
• The time path for fiscal variables: (80) - (82).
• The markets for goods and financial assets clear: (83) - (84).
• The stochastic processes for productivity and capital quality: (85) - (86).
D. Robustness and other figures
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Figure 4. Impulse response functions for model with unanticipated bail-in (blue, solid) vs. model with anticipated
bail-in that is executed one quarter after the shock arrives and unanticipated tax on short-term debt (red, dashed).
Both interventions have bank debt write downs equal to 5% of annual steady state output. The financial crisis is
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